In defence of deliberative democracy: challenging less democratic school governing body practices by Adams, Fareed & Waghid, Yusef
25
South African Journal of Education
Copyright © 2005 EASA
Vol 25(1)25–33
In defence of deliberative democracy: challenging less democratic
school governing body practices
Fareed Adams and Yusef Waghid
Department of Ed ucation Policy Studies, University of Stellenbosch, ,  Private Bag X1, Matieland, 7602 South Africa
One  of the major features of the democratisation of education in South Africa revolves around the decentralisation of school governance. In this regard important
decision-making responsibilities have devolved from central government to "self-governing" school communities, incorporated into Scho ol Governing Bodies
(SG Bs).  The s tudy exp lores curre nt practice s of SG Bs in se lected s choo ls in the Gra ssy P ark area of the Western Cape. It seeks to demonstrate that a dichotomy
app ears  to exist between the ideals of democratic policies as espoused in the South African Schools Act of 1996 and the ma nner in which  these  de mo cra tic
ideals/policies are interpreted/implemented. The promulgation of the South African Sc hoo ls A ct o f 19 96  heralded  the  be ginnin g of a  new phase in the governance
of schools. However, the mere promulgation of policy does not necessarily imply its effective implementation. It is  argued that despite the existence  of the So uth
African Schools Act (SASA), school governing practices do not seem to be conclusively democratic. Unless school governing practices are reconceptualised
and re structured  in acco rdanc e w ith a notion of de liberative dem ocrac y, such p ractices w ill continue to  remain less  dem ocratic. 
Introduction
The promulgation of the South African Schools Act (Act No. 84 of
1996) had as its aim to "advance the democratic transformation of so-
ciety" (South African Schools Act, 1996:1). The Act makes provision
for democratically elected community-based school governing bodies
(SGBs). School governance was in most cases a new terrain for the
overwhelming majority of South African communities. Peters (in
Aspin, 1995:56) states that "Citizens of a democracy do not simply
arrive at political maturity and stand ready, willing and able to run its
institutions". Implicit in this statement is the need for training for those
governors who are to serve on school governing bodies. For the elec-
ted governors to function effectively, they should have a fair under-
standing of what the principles of democracy entail. Thus, for any
structure to function democratically, its participants should have a fair
understanding of what democracy is. Participants need to be educated
and empowered regarding the principles of democracy.
Moving towards democratic school governance
Embedded in the practice of collective or participatory decision
making with regards to educational governance in schools is the notion
that school governing bodies (SGBs) need to function according to
principles of democracy as espoused in the South African Constitution
of 1996. This view is corroborated by Potgieter et al. (1997:2), who
claim that since 1996 the Republic of South Africa has had a demo-
cratic Constitution, which in turn implies that SGBs have to function
democratically. The new education system, therefore, encourages
community participation. Whereas community participation (in pre-
viously disadvantaged schools) was considerably less democratic prior
to 1996, it was statutorily changed into bodies that encourage partici-
pation, consultation, co-operation and partnership — all features of
democratic decision making. Our concern, however, is that it seems as
if SGBs in disadvantaged schools do not necessarily adhere to tenets
of democracy as emphasised in the South African Constitution and the
South African Schools Act of 1996. Problems seem to arise when the
Act and its implementation are at variance with each other, that is, the
practice of school governance particularly in disadvantaged schools
seems to be contrary to what the Act purports. It is in this context that
we address the question as to whether SGBs in disadvantaged schools
necessarily enact democratic principles as advocated in the Act of
1996. In other words, our investigation aims to clarify and explain
what members of SGBs at selected historically disadvantaged schools
in the Grassy Park area understand and experience by the  notions of
democracy, governance, community and transformation. Hendricks
(2000:2) claims the following: 
For the democratisation of school governance to take place, it
should become the preserve of the ordinary lay person. Policies
promulgated in the Act create spaces for the application of demo-
cratic principles. These spaces need to be filled or utilised with
the distinct purpose of contributing towards sound school gover-
nance based on the principles as provided in the Act. Participa-
tion in school-based governance has the potential of contributing
to the democratic transformation of whole school communities.
However, Waghid (2001:1) posits that "... effective policy initiatives
driven by functional or instrumental preoccupations are not only con-
ceptually flawed but also deprive education of its wider human pur-
poses". 
This presupposes that simply participating in the system of SGBs
would not necessarily lead to democratic transformation, as Hendricks
claims. On the contrary, there are many variables which impact on
SGBs that have to be considered to determine whether their practices
contribute towards sustaining the principles of democracy. Although
the Act theoretically provides spaces for democratic transformation,
it is when the Act has to be transformed into practice that problems
seem to arise. This might be because democracy is not an inflexible
system with built-in mechanisms to distinguish between "right and
wrong". Furthermore, democracy embeds constitutive principles such
as participation, community engagement, rationality, consensus, equa-
lity and freedom. An understanding of some of these constitutive
principles of democracy is essential, because if these principles are
undermined in any way, it brings the democratic function into dispute.
It is our contention that governors in the five schools do not seem to
exhibit an understanding of these principles, thus resulting in less de-
mocratic practices.
Constitutive meanings of democratic discourse 
Before we proceed with a clarification of the concept "democracy", we
first offer some insight into the Act, by drawing from certain sections
of the preamble of the Act which have a bearing on this article. Our
purpose is twofold: firstly, to become acquainted with this section
(certain sections) of the Act, and secondly, to ascertain whether SGB
practices are implemented in accordance with the constitutive prin-
ciples of democracy implicit in the stated policies. In the preamble to
Act 84 of 1996 the following is stated:
... (T)his country requires a new nationa l system  for sc hools w hich  will
redress past injustices in educational provision, provide an education of
progressive ly high quality for al l learners and in so doing lay a strong
foundation for the development of al l our people's talents and capa-
bilities, advance the democratic transformation of society, combat ra-
cism and sexism and al l other forms of unfair discrimination and in-
tolerance, contrib ute  to the erad ication o f poverty and the e con om ic
well-being of soc iety, ... and promote the acceptance of responsibi li ty for
the organisation, governance and funding  of schools in  partnership  with
the State. (South African Schools Act, 1996:1)
Our interest is in advancing "the democratic transformation of
society and to combat all forms of unfair discrimination". One of the
major intentions of the Act is to advance the concept of democracy
and to transform South African society from a racially divided society
to a more democratic one. The Act is incessant in its reference to prin-
ciples of democracy, continually referring to the Constitution and the
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Bill of Rights of 1996, and the democratic ethos which inspired the
Constitution. We shall now explore the constitutive meanings of de-
mocracy, particularly the concepts of freedom, dialogism, power and
rationality. 
Our focus is on democracy as a sphere for social and political
life, which is constituted by the values of positive liberty (freedom of
self-development) and political equality (Carr & Hartnett in Waghid,
2001:84). We want to emphasise the notion of democracy, as a sphere
for social relationships, for this is precisely what SGBs are about. The
different stakeholders serving on SGBs (parents, teachers, learners,
non-teaching staff and the principal) invariably relate to one another
socially. Social democracy challenges class distinctions and promotes
equality of opportunity for all citizens. This understanding of social
democracy may arguably include equality in class freedom from ra-
cial, ethnic, religious and gender discrimination. Pateman (1979:27),
however, sees social democracy as emphasising participation on the
grounds of equality and liberty. In this respect it means that people
have the right to control their lives, so that they may become compe-
tent at self-management and self-governance. It is particularly the
reference to self-management and self-governance that informs our
understanding of democracy with specific reference to SGBs. Barber
argues that a democracy is "about common decision-making and
action, about doing things in common, in the absence of truth and in
the presence of conflict — even ignorance" (Barber, 1994:44). This
statement leads us to conclude that the process of democracy operates
within a domain of conflict where common decision-making becomes
the rule. If this is the case, consensus is forced into play. The general
defining principle of consensus is a sharing that somehow binds. Sha-
ring in this sense refers to a general agreement among the members of
a community on fundamental issues which affect them all. Consensus
revolves around what is commonly referred to as "the rules of the
game", of which the one paramount rule that must precede all others
is the one that establishes how conflicts are to be resolved. The claim
that in a democracy "we agree to disagree" has its roots in such an
understanding of consensus. Disagreement within such rules is the dis-
agreement that democracy protects and furthers. The conflict-solving
rule is, therefore, a prerequisite of democracy. It is apparent that con-
sensus is not only an integral part of democracy, but that the system
cannot function meaningfully without it. Therefore, democracy needs
to create space for criticism and even dissent within the context of
consensus or according to the rule of "agree to disagree". In this regard
Sartori (1987:92) claims that a dynamic processing of consensus based
on the principle that whatever claims to be rightful, or true, must hold
its own against, and be revitalised by, criticism and dissent.
In order for democracy to succeed it is imperative that its basic
qualities or principles not only be kept intact, but also nurtured. Con-
versely, a violation or negation of its constitutive meanings would be
tantamount to undermining the concept of democracy which could
possibly lead to undemocratic practices. Although it is arguably a very
difficult task to determine what all these qualities or principles are, for
the purposes of this article we explore the concepts of freedom, power,
dialogism and rationality, as constitutive features of democracy. In
doing so, we shall refer to other relational meanings such as tolerance,
deliberation, responsibility and accountability. Our purpose for doing
this is directly related to determining whether SGB practices neces-
sarily enact principles of democracy as espoused in the Act.
Freedom    
If we say that people are not free to do something, we are suggesting
that there is something or somebody that is stopping them. Laws and
regulations curtail their options, while they are subjected to a variety
of social pressures (Peters, 1973:120). Freedom only prevails if there
is a general system of regulation that safeguard against interference
from others (Peters, 1973:121). Traditional theories have viewed the
democratic form of governance as the condition for human freedom,
where this freedom is conceived principally in terms of the liberty of
individuals to do as they choose without external constraints (Gould,
1988:31). In terms of this understanding of freedom, democracy is a
system of political rule where freedom is at its utmost and where con-
straints to reasonably ensure social order prevail by mutual consent.
To explain the relationship between "freedom" and "constraint", Birch
(1993:96) posits: "The inherent importance of liberty to human beings
arises from the fact that they are essentially choosing creatures, con-
stantly taking decisions about how they want to act. The limitations on
liberty arise from the fact that human beings are also social creatures,
constrained in their choices by all kinds of social pressures." Berlin (in
Gould, 1988:35) asserts that: "I am normally said to be free to the de-
gree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Poli-
tical liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act
unobstructed by others." Benn and Peters (in Gould, 1988:35) suggest
that, "in general, when we say that a person is free, we mean that, if a
person wants to do something, he will not be impeded by some kind
of constraint or limitation." The terms liberty and freedom are used
interchangeably, giving the impression that they are synonyms. For the
purposes of this article, we also use the terms "liberty" and "freedom"
as synonyms. Arend (in Birch, 1993:95), however, states that "in a po-
litical context the terms are commonly used in slightly different ways,
with liberty more likely to be used when the writer means the absence
of restraint and freedom more likely to be used when the writer means
the opportunity to engage in some activity, such as political partici-
pation." Pitkin (in Birch, 1993:95) comments on Berlin's use of these
terms as " ... liberty when referring to what he called the negative con-
cept of liberty, and freedom when he gave examples of what he called
the positive concept of liberty." What is evident in this observation is
an understanding that there is a distinct difference between Berlin's
negative and positive liberty. Birch (1993:96) elaborates on this inter-
pretation: "On the one hand liberty has been defined as freedom for the
individual to do whatever he or she wants to do; in short, that liberty
is the absence of restraint. This is the negative concept of liberty. On
the other hand, liberty has been asserted to be freedom to do things
that are worth doing, to engage in self-development, to have a share of
the government of one's society. This is positive liberty." We are more
interested in the understanding of Berlin's positive liberty, for it in-
cludes the idea of "self-development". 
To further expound on the meaning of "self-development", we
turn to Gould (1988:32), who argues that the concept of freedom
should be understood more broadly than simply entailing the absence
of external constraints. She argues "not only for the absence of exter-
nal constraint, but also for the availability of social and material con-
ditions necessary for the achievement of purposes or plans." She fur-
ther claims that, although the traditional view of freedom captures an
important aspect of what freedom is, it fails to address two key fea-
tures. Firstly, it ignores the contemporary requirement that the means
necessary for the realisation of a choice should be available. By this
she means that the social and material means for realising purposes are
essential to freedom. She refers to these social and material means as
"the enabling conditions" for freedom (Gould, 1988:35). Secondly, it
leaves out of consideration the development of a person over time,
meaning the realisation of long-term plans. In this way Gould contests
the "negative freedom" concept, claiming that a person can only be
free if he (she) possesses the requirements, or what she refers to as
"enabling conditions", to make a specific choice. 
The conception or understanding of freedom as self-development
as espoused by Gould is critical to the functioning of SGBs, precisely
because this form of governance is new to the South African parent
community. Being the majority on the SGB, parents have to adapt to
this new role. In fact all the stakeholders, be they parents, teachers or
the principal, have acquired the authority (via the Act) to make deci-
sions in an environment which is unfamiliar to them. One cannot pre-
suppose that by serving on the SGB will automatically lead to demo-
cratic practices. On the contrary, self-development in Gould's sense is
essential to enhance freedom, and with it keep this principle of demo-
cracy intact. 
Of particular significance to this understanding of freedom, which
relates directly to SGBs, is the notion of "co-operative forms of social
interaction, access to training and reciprocal recognition of each
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other's free agency". "Free agency" in this respect can be linked to the
notion of autonomy, where the individual can reach his/her own con-
clusions. Peters (1973:123) posits that: "Being a chooser is a standard
expected of anyone — which is related to norms of rationality ...". He
proposes three criteria for autonomy: authenticity, rational reflection
and strength of will. Authenticity refers to the individual making rules
for him/herself, thus adopting a way of life that is distinct from one
being dictated to by others. Rational reflection occurs when the in-
dividual is aware of rules and conventions as alterable, continually
subject to change. These changes which the individual effects criti-
cally, impact on his (her) construction of "a way of life". Strength of
will refers to the ability of the individual to stick to one's principles,
which have been acquired through rational reflection (Peters, 1973:
123-125). Also implicit in the interpretation of freedom as "co-
operative forms of social interaction" is an understanding of power re-
lations, and an adherence to tolerance of opposing points of view, as
well as transparency. These conceptions are central to the notion of
freedom, and a disregard for any one of them would translate into less
freedom. This interpretation of freedom is critical to ensure that SGBs
function democratically. Conversely, a disregard for freedom in this
sense would inevitably lead to less democratic practices.
Power     
Whilst power is analytically a difficult notion, historically and in the
history of political thought it is a fairly straightforward one. Power is
a political and not an ethical concept. Sartori (1987:28) claims that
power is not freedom, for the reason that power is the force and capa-
bility to control others. Implicit to such a depiction of power is the
idea that force comes into play, when power is used to "control"
others. In a democracy, however, using power to control others does
not automatically translate into inducing force. The first criterion in
the achievement of power should be legitimate attainment. In most
cases this legitimate power is realised through free and fair elections.
This leads to an understanding that elected representatives gain (poli-
tical) power in contrast to assuming it. The elected representative is
answerable to those who elected him/her. In this regard Sartori (1987:
30) makes the point that: "If he who is elected is not regarded as the
representative of those who elect him, the election simply creates, per
se, an absolute ruler." There is a subsequent linkage between what
Sartori refers to as "a normative expectation (that is also, via remova-
bility, a sanctionable expectation) of responsiveness and accountability
of the person elected to an electorate. This implies that the people as
a whole actually wield power. Put differently, if the elected repre-
sentative misrepresents "the people", mechanisms exist to remove him/
her. However, Bobbio (1987:47) claims that the mode in which repre-
sentatives are representing have a direct bearing on power. He asserts
that "the age-old debate on political representation is dominated by at
least two issues ... which lead to diametrically opposed political posi-
tions. The first issue concerns the powers of the representative, the
second what representation involves." We are more interested in the
issue concerning power, meaning how the electorate is being repre-
sented. Bobbio (1987:47) further argues for two types of represen-
tation. We quote his theory at length to clarify this point:
How does A represent B? A can represent B either in the role of
a delegate or in the role of "fiduciary". If it is a delegate, A is
purely and simply a spokesman, an ambassador, an emissary, a
messenger of those he represents, and thus the scope of the man-
date is extremely restricted and revocable ad nutum. If, on the
other hand, A is in the position of a fiduciary, this confers the
power to act with a certain independence in the name of and on
behalf of those represented.
In the second instance, the elected representative as a fiduciary may
use his discretion to interpret the interests of his electorate, meaning
that he operates without a binding mandate. Bobbio (1987:47) refers
to this as representation without "mandation". Implicit in this interpre-
tation is the fact that the representative has to represent and be ans-
werable to his/her constituency. In terms of the SGB, this seems to be
a recipe for conflict, for each representative is almost forced to
"deliver" to his/her own constituency. Bearing in mind that different
groups are represented on SGBs, conflict in terms of group interest
seems likely. Even though mechanisms for removal because of non-
delivery exist, power still remains a means or measure for control.
This notion of control, as mentioned earlier, may easily lead to con-
flict. The issue therefore should not relate to what power is, or who has
it, but rather, how it should be utilised. We shall now tease out the
implications of this notion with specific reference to SGBs.   
School-based decision-making has become the lynchpin in school
restructuring efforts in South Africa. Membership to SGBs is predeter-
mined by the South African Schools Act and includes the principal,
teachers, non-teaching staff, parents and learners. By bringing these
"voices" together, power and influence are distributed to individuals
who traditionally had a previously curtailed voice within school gover-
nance. It should also be evident that each representative grouping
would want to enhance their own interests, which could possibly occur
at the expense of another group's interests. It is this type of manoeuvre
which leads to the decision-making process becoming an arena of
strife, struggle and conflict. The manner in which this conflict is han-
dled fits comfortably into the approach in relation to the utilisation of
power. A specific type of power is what Rahim (in Johnson & Scollay,
2001:49) identifies as leadership power. He claims that leadership
power is "the ability of one party to change or control the behaviour,
attitudes, opinions, objectives, needs and values of another party".
French and Raven (in Johnson & Scollay, 2001:49) identify five
leadership power bases:
1. Legitimate power — the legitimate right of the leader usually by
virtue of the position that the leader holds to prescribe or control
behaviour;
2. Coercive power — the leader's control over punishment;
3. Reward power — the leader's control over reward;
4. Expert power — the leader's special knowledge or expertise; and
5. Referent power — the subordinate's desire to identify with the
leader.
The school principal (leader) utilises one or more of these power bases
to influence subordinates (Johnson & Scollay, 2001:49). The term
"subordinates" used in this sense is significant for it assumes degrees
of authority. If this is so, then one might reasonably presume that the
representative groups serving on SGBs are not equal. Sartori (1987:30)
reinforces this understanding when he claims that within any group of
people as a whole (for instance, all the representatives on the SGB)
some people count more, while others count less. We understand
"count" to relate to the individual capacities that each governor brings
into the SGB system. If this interpretation makes sense, then the notion
of "subordinates" can comfortably fit into the notion of democracy
without alarm bells ringing. It would be ridiculous to expect that
teachers, learners and parents must all be equal in terms of the skill
levels they possess. Rahim (in Johnson & Scollay, 2001:49) found that
the utilisation of legitimate, expert and referent power bases was posi-
tively associated with compliance, whilst reward and coercive power
are associated with resistance. Because resistance is a form of conflict,
it stands to reason that the school governors should be in a position to
identify the outcomes of the utilisation of the power bases, prior to
their (i.e. the outcomes?) utilisation. In this way some forms of con-
flict can be avoided. It should, however, be noted that principals, by
virtue of their position of "leadership power", are not the only source
of influence, but that all governing body members should at least have
the potential to influence decision-making processes. Each of the
representative constituencies on SGBs brings its own basis for in-
fluencing decisions.
Continuing with the argument on how power could be utilised to
manage conflict, we now use power as the ability to influence others
in the social environment of the SGB. This translates into influence on
a social level. Social influence is "simply a special instance in cau-
sality, namely, the modification of one person's responses by the ac-
tions of another" (Cartwright in Johson & Scollay, 2001:50). Marsden
and Friedkin (in Johnson & Scollay, 2001:50) claim that when one has
influence, the effect on a decision seems to be without apparent ex-
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ertion of force or direct exercise of command. It includes what Lippitt
et al. (in Johnson & Scollay, 2001:50) refer to as "behavioural conta-
gion", which means involving "the spontaneous pickup or imitation by
others ... (persons in the group) of a behaviour initiated by one
member, where the initiator did not display any intention of getting the
others to do what he did." It also includes what they claim to be "direct
influence", where "the actor initiates behaviour which has the manifest
objective of affecting the behaviour of another member in the group."
It should by now be clear that power or influence is not inextricably
linked to force. On the contrary, there are many ways in which power
can be positively employed without relating to force. It is this kind of
power which should be associated with SGBs practices. 
Furthermore, with power comes responsibility. In this regard
Morrow (1989:3) posits that "A person can be held neither accountable
nor responsible for something which is not under his/her control". Al-
ternatively a person cannot be held responsible for something over
which he/she has no power or influence. The Act codifies the power
in terms of how SGBs should function. We refer to two examples to
show that the responsibility mechanism is directly linked to power.
Firstly, every SGB must operate within a binding constitution, thus
limiting their sphere of influence and power (South African Schools
Act, 1996:9). Secondly, SGB members/governors are legally recogni-
sed as juristic persons, meaning they can be sued (SASA, 1996:8).
Yet, elected representatives are responsible and answerable to their
electorate. This form of "built-in" checks and balances curtails the
misuse of power and could act as a deterrent. In this sense it discou-
rages irresponsible representation.   
Dialogism
According to Habermas (1987:310), "the furious labour of deconstruc-
tion" will have identifiable consequences only when the paradigm of
the philosophy of consciousness will be replaced by the paradigm of
"mutual understanding", in other words, the paradigm of intersubjec-
tivity. The argument here is for a movement towards symmetry as
opposed to asymmetry. The asymmetrical notion of dialogue contra-
dicts the concept of what dialogue actually is, for asymmetry stands
for single directional action. What this means is that asymmetry refers
to a one-way process in which meaning is transferred. Contrary to this
situation, a symmetrical relationship opposes the one-way process and
actually emphasises a co-constructive process in which meaning is
constructed. For example, verbal interaction presupposes an understan-
ding that there is a speaker and a listener. The speaker might influence
the thinking of the listener through what he/she says. If there is no
feedback from the listener, this translates into asymmetry, meaning
one-way communication or single-directional. If, on the other hand,
there is feedback, verbal interaction becomes communication. In this
regard the speaker might influence the thinking of the listener and
vice-versa. This is symmetrical communication or multi-dimensional
interaction. 
"Mutual understanding" has a bearing on SGBs, especially in
terms of its influence or role in democratic practices. Implicit in the
concept of mutual understanding is the notion of deliberation. Put
differently, one cannot move towards mutual understanding without
indulging in what Bohman (1996:23) refers to as "shared practices
with others". According to Bohman these shared practices include
debate and discussion, which are both inherent principles of deli-
beration. Only those who can deliberate can maintain self-government
although, like direct democracy, the Aristotelian deliberative ideal
presupposes a small and homogeneous political community (Bohman,
1996:23). In terms of this ideal as a prerequisite for direct democracy,
it can be assumed that an SGB is such a small community, in which
deliberation might be possible, notwithstanding the constraint of ho-
mogeneity. Bohman further posits that deliberation via the avenue of
dialogue with others creates an opportunity for many diverse capa-
cities to be exercised jointly: "Public dialogue is possible, even with
those with whom we disagree" (Bohman, 1996:24). Deliberation in
this sense is interpersonal; it concerns the process of forming public
reason — one that everyone in the process finds acceptable. In other
words, all citizens are equally empowered and authorised to participate
in deliberation and reasoning about decisions that affect their lives
together (Bohman, 1996:25). It is this understanding of coming to
deliberatively agreed upon decisions which is referred to as dialogism.
Furthermore, citizens deliberate in order to find and construct
what Scanlon calls "informed, unforced general agreement," or alter-
natively, what Habermas calls "uncoerced consensus" (Bohman, 1996:
26). Fletcha (1999:151) strengthens this interpretation when he posits
that "the dialogic approach fosters different people's living together
according to rules agreed upon by all through free ... dialogue." In the
words of Jones (in Waghid, 2001:99): "Citizens of different ethnic, na-
tional and cultural backgrounds can participate in an investigation of
one another's acknowledged prejudices (in particular their feelings
about the sort of life they want to lead) with the aim of arriving at
compromise to which all participants can acquiesce without resent-
ment and which aims at the optimal satisfaction of the conflicting
prejudices of all participants." The dialogical process is therefore
deliberative, a means of what Bohman (1996:27) refers to as exchan-
ging of reasons for the purpose of resolving problematic situations that
cannot be settled without interpersonal coordination and co-operation.
The ultimate aim is to reach an agreed means of settling differences.
In order to reconcile differences or manage conflict, one is left with
the option of either using power claims (including force), or validity
claims as a basis for action (Habermas in Fletcha, 1999:153). In es-
sence they must choose between violence and dialogue (Giddens in
Fletcha, 1999:153). Giddens additionally argues that power claims
impose actions on people, while validity claims seek a consensual
basis for action through argumentation, meaning dialogism. In contrast
to a relativistic approach which does not differentiate between these
two types of claims (because they argue that all claims are generated
by power), the dialogic approach rejects power claims and instead
promotes validity claims (Fletcha, 1999:154). The dialogic approach
works so that people from different ethnic backgrounds can live to-
gether in the same educational system, using rules that result from dia-
logue among them (Fletcha, 1999:154). Concerning multicultural re-
lations, Fletcha (1999:164) identifies three main characteristics of the
dialogic perspective, which include equality of differences, sharing
territories and radicalisation of democracy. In relation to what is meant
by "equality of difference", we quote Fletcha at length.
1. Unlike relativism (post-modern racism), the dialogic perspective
emphasises the need for equal rights among ethnicities as well as
among diverse social sectors and people;
2. It aims to promote a transformation to principles such as equality
and freedom. Under this view, difference is simply part of equa-
lity — the equal right of everybody to live differently;
3. The dialogic approach aims for an equal position for all ethnici-
ties, groups and individuals, especially in education; where equa-
lity is important in allowing everyone to acquire the competences
that allow them to transcend their present societal barriers; and
4. Difference is necessary to promote the maintenance and develop-
ment of one's own culture and identity, whilst equality is neces-
sary to prevent marginalization and exclusion (Fletcha, 1999:
164).
What makes dialogism an acceptable instrument of attaining concilia-
tion? Dialogism generates pluriculturalism (living out your differen-
ces) and interculturalism (people share new forms of living and new
cultural hybrids) (Fletcha, 1999:166). In other words, dialogism ex-
tends and radicalises democratic discourse whereby it is possible for
different human beings to share and live together in solidarity, in the
sense that individuals want their actions to be directed by the com-
munity of which they are members (Waghid, 2001:100). To further
corroborate this kind of dialogism, we turn to Jones (1998:150), who
argues as follows:
This is not the usual debate about truth and who is right or wrong.
It is an attempt to understand others and ourselves as people from
different backgrounds and is the basis for a compromise aimed at
allowing us to live together as a functioning and unified social
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unit rather than as a collection of warring factions living together
in geographic proximity.
A point we have alluded to earlier is that SGBs bring together people
from different economic, ethnic, religious and social backgrounds.
This body is further fragmented into pressure groups (parents, learners
and teachers), each advancing their own interest. The consequence of
this is that the SGB arena becomes a site of struggle and, in all proba-
bility, conflict. If the goal is moving towards harmony and peaceful
co-existence, then we suggest that dialogism as a tool for collective
action should seriously be considered. 
Given the fragmented nature in terms of the composition of
SGBs, the adherence to dialogism as a constitutive principle of demo-
cracy seems a viable option. In fact, a failure to invoke this dialogic
principle might enhance conflict, which could ultimately result in less
democratic practices. This could in turn create a situation which might
nullify the very reason for the existence of SGBs. We now turn to a
discussion of rationality as a constitutive meaning of democracy.
Rationality    
Rationality as described by Peters (1998:224) entails engaging (in-
dividually) in pursuit of "various differentiated forms of enquiry ...
instantiating ... respect for facts and evidence, precision, clarity, re-
jection of arbitrariness, consistency, and the general determination to
get to the bottom of things". Also, rationality is not disconnected from
the activities (communal or dialogical) of human beings in relation to
each other. It is on the level of human actions that one may conclude
that something is rational. Dialogical or communal activities in this
regard are "not a contingent arrangement of individual persons", but
a practice that creates possibilities for individuals and social groupings
to build their patterns of social activities in relation to moral values
(Peters in Waghid, 2001:3). Tierney (in Waghid, 2001:65) argues that
rationality "constructs our beings and roles in relation to others, over
and over again through engagement with others in meaning making.
Contained in this understanding of rationality is the recognition that it
is a requirement to clarify our reasons for choosing a particular point
of view. In another way it means that rationality acknowledges the
individual's willingness to express and provide reasons in support of
his or her self-interpretations and judgments in a lucid, coherent and
logical manner (Waghid, 2001:86). Taylor (1985:137) supports this
view when he states that: "Rational articulation seems to involve being
able to say clearly what the matter in question is ... (in such a way
that) we have a rational grasp of something when we can articulate it,
that means, distinguish and lay out the different features of the matter
in perspicuous order". One has to supply good reasons in support of
one's claims. Habermas reinforces this understanding when he argues
that "a politics radically situated in this world should be justifiable on
the basis of reason ... " (1997:41). Also embedded in the concept of
rationality in quest of attaining the "moral good" (with earlier refer-
ence to Peters), are notions such as truth telling, rejection of arbi-
trariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency and a respect
for evidence and people.  
This brings us to a discussion of some of the findings of SGB
practices in selected disadvantaged schools in the Western Cape's
southern suburbs. We frame our findings in relation to constitutive
meanings of democratic discourse as expounded above. 
 
SGB practices in disadvantaged schools in Grassy park/
Lotus-River: a case study
We conducted our research in five historically disadvantaged schools
in areas where sub-economic houses rented from the local municipa-
lity surround all these schools. Most of the houses have outbuildings
constructed of zinc and cardboard. Two schools are adjacent to in-
formal housing settlements (squatter camps). The schools are situated
in an area where there are many shebeens and where drug merchants
are seen as role models because of their seemingly affluent lifestyle.
Gangsterism, alcohol and drug abuse are rife. The overall impression
is that these communities are extremely poor. 
The research included a conceptual study as well as an empirical
section. For the empirical research we conducted 35 semi-structured
interviews with governors from the five respective schools. They in-
cluded the principal, two teacher representatives, two parent repre-
sentatives of whom one was the chairperson, a non-teaching staff
representative and a learner representative from each of the five res-
pective schools. This was followed by informal discussions with
parents and other community workers from the surrounding area who
have children at these schools. Our purpose was to ascertain whether
SGB practices are in accordance with the principles of democracy as
argued for, and as determined by, the South African Schools Act (Act
84 of 1996). Put differently, we wanted to ascertain how governors
interpret and give meaning to the Act. We interacted with these
governors in order to determine their reasons for performing their par-
ticular actions (Fay, 1975:71). We therefore worked within the inter-
pretive paradigm. From analysing these  data and newspaper reports
one may conclude that the region where these schools are located is a
dangerous one, where unemployment (we are told) exceeds 50%. The
Southern Mail (a local newspaper) reports in a letter to the editor that
"even the Grassy Park police will not enter it [the area] during daylight
hours. I do not keep a record of murders but I believe it averages two
a week" (August 18, 2004). Besides such utterances, our findings sug-
gest that major challenges exist in relation to the way that democracy
is practised in these disadvantaged schools. We shall, however, only
refer to the findings that directly impact on "democratic governance"
in accordance with the principles that we argued for. We shall now
explore some of these challenges in relation to democratic discourse.
The lack of training and the constitutive principle of freedom 
Firstly, we discuss the issue of a lack of "enabling conditions" for
freedom. This is a feature that prevails among all the schools in the
case study. All school governors referred to a lack of training, which
prevents them from fulfilling their duties effectively. The deficiency
in training seems to be at variance with the Act. Under the heading
"Enhancement of capacity of governing bodies", the Act states the
following:
1. Out of funds appropriated for this purpose by the provincial legis-
lature the Head of Department must establish a programme to:
(a) provide introductory training for newly elected governing bodies to
enable them to perform their functions; and
(b) provide continuing trainin g to governing bodies to promote the
effective performance of their functions or to enable them to as-
sume add itional fu nc tions. (South African Schools Act, 1996:8)
The above provisions are clear, meaning that the onus is on the
Western Cape Education Department (WCED) to facilitate the training
of school governors, firstly to "enable them to perform their functions"
and, secondly, to promote the "effective performance of their func-
tions". Our findings clearly revealed lack of training to be a major
deficiency. None of the 35 interviewed, neither the principals (of the
respective schools) nor the other 10 governors (who participated in
informal discussions), had any formal training (via the WCED) with
regard to school governance. Respondents continually referred to "not
knowing the rules" (with reference to the Act). A parent representative
sums it up: "If you want to play soccer then you must know the rules,
so if you are on the SGB you must know the rules. We don't, but we
do what the principal wants. All we know is that we must vote and the
majority rules".  
We argued that "enabling conditions" should be "social condi-
tions" which included access to training and education, without which
an individual cannot be "free". This understanding of freedom incor-
porates a conception of self-development, which is critical for the
functioning of SGBs. We previously argued that, in order to keep the
principle of democracy intact, "self-development" in Gould's sense is
essential to enhance freedom. A lack of training to empower school
governors would, therefore, retard this form of self-development. This
might lead to less democratic practices. Berlin (in Gould, 1988:39)
claims that poverty or a lack of education may render liberty useless.
This is the second issue that the research findings expose. 
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Poverty and freedom
The findings show that these school communities are extremely poor
and that governors lack the necessary education levels to enact their
roles effectively. It is our contention that the poor economic conditions
of these communities have a direct bearing on their capacity to par-
ticipate in structures that do not bring any significant economic gains.
Parent governors at four of the schools alluded to the economic con-
dition within their school communities. One governor sums it up when
he claims that "people struggle to feed themselves and all their energy
goes into making ends meet. How can people who cannot maintain
their own family still be expected to help with the functioning of the
school? Even fundraising efforts return poor yields because of the
economic conditions in the community". Mr Anderson (a principal)
responds by claiming that "people do not do voluntary work anymore.
They want to be paid. I can understand that it is because they have no
other form of income." Mr Delft (a parent representative) concurs
when he explains that "parents would make themselves available if
they can earn some money in the process". From our interaction with
other community members we received the same response.   
In terms of our earlier argument these school governors' possess
an "abstract freedom", which could be considered meaningless (Gould,
1988:35). In other words, one cannot expect democratic practices to
be enhanced when one does not have access to "real freedom". In fact
this form of "pseudo-freedom" may retard democratic practices, an
issue which the findings also highlight. We argued that poverty retards
movement towards "real freedom", thus creating a semblance of free-
dom under the guise that the structures for democracy exist, while the
capacity to access such structures becomes difficult because of peo-
ple's socio-economic status.  
Representation in democratic practice
Thirdly, we turn to the criterion of representation and its relation to
democracy. The thrust of our earlier argument revolves around res-
ponsible representation, meaning that the representative (school gover-
nor) is answerable to the electorate. The study revealed that there is a
break in communication between elected members (of the SGB) and
the constituency it represents. This inevitably leads to decisions being
taken without a mandate. This initially should not cause major prob-
lems as long as the representative is answerable to his/her electorate.
Because of the lack of communication between the representative and
the electorate, not having a mandate on the part of the representative
becomes problematic, leading to less democratic practices. The study
showed this to be the case, precisely because the governors of SGBs
do not seem to be answerable to their constituencies. Most of the
respondents alluded to the problem of conducting meetings. Four of
the chairpersons explained that parents are scared to attend meetings
because of gangster activity in the region. Mr Anderson and Mr Smith
(principals at two of the schools) argue that "it is too dangerous to
attend meetings after dark, because you might become a victim of
assault or robbery". Mr Anderson laments that, "even the meeting to
determine school fees was poorly attended. I had three attempts in
conducting this meeting before I had a quorum. Our parent represen-
tatives concluded that the parent community is not interested in school
governance". At four of the schools they argued that "we have the
right to make decisions if the parent community do not respond to
notices of meetings to discuss important issues. It is not as if we do not
attempt to get a mandate". Two teacher representatives confirmed that
"when parents collect their children's progress reports, those who are
interested are told of developments". When we asked them whether
they tried any other means of communicating with the parent com-
munity, the overwhelming response was that the "minutes of the mee-
tings" are available. We then put it to them that they earlier reported
that most parents cannot read. Most of the parent representatives
responded by claiming "then they should show more interest in their
children and make an effort to find out what is happening with their
governing body." The findings revealed other problems such as
participation, transparency and a misuse of power and authority. On
the issue of power, Mr Parker (a principal) explained: "While demo-
cracy is important, I must manipulate the process to get the desired
outcome. On quite a few occasions decisions were recorded at SGB
level but not implemented because the school management team
determines that it is counter-productive, and consequently decides on
another course of action". Many teacher representatives complain
about the autocratic style of principles. Mr Mullen (teacher repre-
sentative) sums it up when he claims that "decisions are reached but
a day later you find the decision is changed, under the guise of the best
interest of the school". Regarding the issue of participation, four of the
principals complained that parent and learner representatives seldom
speak in meetings. The parent representatives responded (in a dis-
tinctive Afrikaans dialect) that meetings are conducted in English and
they speak Afrikaans. They concluded by stating that decisions are
made by "majority rule". These deficiencies translate into SGB prac-
tices becoming less free. Because freedom is a constitutive part of
democracy, we have shown how this might lead to less democratic
practices.  
The question arises: do SGB practices endorse or fail to adjust to
democratic principles? From the findings the impression is created that
there seems to be a link between poverty and participation. The
schools in the case study serve sub-economic communities where un-
employment, alcoholism, drug abuse and general violence are en-
demic. In these schools the surrounding communities have major
problems in terms of daily survival. Their main concern seems to be
to make ends meet. Under these circumstances it is clear why school
managers (principals) find it difficult to secure members of the
community to serve on the SGBs. In fact, in most cases individuals
alluded to wanting some form of remuneration for serving on the SGB.
These inherent living difficulties spill over into the school environ-
ment to such an extent that these schools can only charge nominal
amounts for school fees. The economic conditions of the community,
therefore, have a direct influence on the school's ability to raise funds.
Four of the chairpersons explained that parents were reluctant to serve
on SGBs because ultimately serving on the SGB translates into raising
funds. Teacher representatives at these schools claimed that "the fund-
raising committee decides on a fund-raising venture then simply pass
it on to the staff to organise and implement." In these communities
fund-raising is an extra burden, something that these parents can do
without. The (in)ability to raise funds, in turn, has a bearing on the
capacity of the school to function and compete with other schools in
more affluent areas. We contend that the struggle for daily existence
plays a role in discouraging members from serving on SGBs. This
continuous struggle in effect curtails the freedom of the community,
because it ignores the contemporary requirement that the means neces-
sary for the realisation of a choice should be available. If the social
and material means are not satisfied, school governors cannot achieve
the realisation of their purposes. 
In terms of this an understanding, it is clear that social and in
particular economic conditions are inextricably linked to realising
one's purpose, which in this regard is to achieve democratically func-
tioning SGBs. This limitation in the schools that serve their surround-
ing sub-economic communities has a direct influence on their ability
to function according to a type of democratic ethos as explained ear-
lier. Social and economic conditions impact on a poor community's
inability to participate in democratic structures. At this point we have
to point out that we are not arguing that poor communities do not have
the potential to endorse or implement democratic procedures. We are
merely interpreting the data, which suggest that these poor communi-
ties have less energy to become direct participants in democratic SGB
structures. They tend to shy away from participation simply because
their energies are geared towards making a daily existence. Notwith-
standing the unmanageable economic circumstances of the schools
serving a sub-economic community, the Western Cape Education De-
partment (WCED) expects that the disadvantaged schools in the case
study must manage and pay the salaries of teachers who substitute for
those who apply for "furlough" (accumulated leave). If the schools are
not in a position to do so, the individual educator who applied for
leave is refused such leave. From a democratic point of view this is
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unfair, firstly because the leave is not a privilege but a right in terms
of educator conditions of service. Secondly, the educator at the disad-
vantaged school is actually being penalised for serving in a sub-
economic community. It seems as if the government via the WCED is
shifting the financial responsibility of educator remuneration (in
particular instances) onto communities that cannot afford to assume
such a responsibility. Ultimately parent representatives do make them-
selves available to serve. However, at three of the schools parents
agreed that they made themselves available because if they did not do
so the school would not have a governing body. They therefore made
themselves available so that the situation should not reflect badly on
the principal. They claimed that they are not interested in dialogue or
debate. What is important to them is that they do what the principal
wants because he knows best. In this regard their actions are counter
to the principles of dialogue and rational argumentation, which we
argued are constitutive principles of democracy. 
Lastly, we want to refer to the current practice regarding teacher
promotions. Without exception, all five schools fail to comply with the
criteria for promotion posts, as espoused in the Act. In this regard the
Act states the following:
... (T)he  pos t must be accessible to a ll who m ay qua lify or are interested
in applying fo r such post(s) ... the fi ll ing of educator posts must be non
discrim inatory and in keeping with the provisions of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa.  (ELRC, 1999:3C-24)
SGB representatives are at pains to explain why they advertise
promotion posts, but would only in exceptional circumstances consider
an "outside" application, that is, a person from another school. This
means that prior to the advertisement there is agreement that only
applicants from within the particular school would be considered. This
practice in terms of the Act is in direct contravention of the non-
discriminatory provision. The practice also seems to be shrouded in
secrecy, thus transgressing the transparency provision of the Act. In
terms of democratic principles we contend that this form of appoint-
ment is less democratic. Unless every applicant has the same chance
to participate and secure the promotion post, this practice in fact un-
dermines the basic principles of democracy. Although the argument of
a ratio system determining the number of posts a school may have
seems to impact on this practice, it does not excuse the practitioners
from implementing their own system. We make this claim because the
findings show that the post is filled before the advertisement has even
been placed. This is, therefore, a move towards nepotism, which could
be interpreted as an undemocratic practice. This practice, if exposed,
can lead to serious consequences, such as disputes being declared. The
SGB is also a legal/juristic person (body), meaning that this practice
might potentially lead to costly law suites. A potential critic might
argue that governing bodies do not make appointments, and rightly so.
However, in most cases the recommendation of the governing body is
accepted, meaning the Head of Department (at the WCED) would only
in exceptional cases rule against the governing body recommendation.
It is our contention that an analysis of the data illustrates that SGB
practices are at variance with the concept of democracy. It seems as if
SGBs in the disadvantaged communities identified in the study have
not yet acquired the skills to adjust their practices towards the type of
democratic ethos enunciated in the Act.  
Conclusion: in defence of deliberative democracy
We shall now attempt to chart out a way beyond this untenable posi-
tion by claiming that a more deliberative type of democracy might
enhance the chances of more democratic practices to occur in SGBs.
The notion of democracy developed earlier ultimately hinges
upon a form of majority rule which does not necessarily advance the
notion of deliberation. We contend that deliberation is a necessary
condition to ensure more democratic SGB practices.  Although we
referred to deliberation in our discussion of dialogism, there remain
gaps in this understanding. Firstly, participation does not necessarily
translate into engagement, meaning that one might participate in a
process without actually engaging its participants. Findings from the
study show that in the SGBs parent and learner representatives par-
ticipate, while their "voices" are seldom heard. They participate with-
out having the opportunity to influence decisions, meaning they are
actually excluded from the process. Moreover, we have argued that
parent and learner representatives should be afforded the opportunity
to actively participate "freely and through reasoned deliberation".
Following such a procedure could lead to more democratic practices.
Although some of the school managers claim that there is space within
their SGBs for a fair exchange of ideas, this does not translate into the
"other" being able to influence the decision. The "power concept"
comes into play, meaning that in most cases the manager on the SGB,
by virtue of his/her position of authority, has the decisive influence. In
most cases his/her decision holds sway, because he/she seems to
"know best".
Earlier on in the article we made reference to two forms of dia-
logue as expounded by Habermas, which relate to symmetrical and
asymmetrical forms of dialogue. We pointed out the contradiction that
might occur through this verbal interaction, which Habermas terms
"communication". It is our contention that communication does not
necessarily mean dialogue. You may listen to what the other person
has to say and even react to what he/she says (symmetrical dialogue),
but the communication, which exists in this verbal interplay, might
hinge on power. Put differently, the chance exists for the more power-
ful or the one with more authority to dominate, leading to an accep-
tance of the dominant view. This might occur irrespective of whether
the dominant view is the more rational or plausible argument. We have
earlier alluded to the school manager, whose point of view becomes
acceptable simply because the myth exists that he/she "knows best".
It is this form of communication that we are referring to. 
Moreover, it is imperative for school managers to overcome the
notion that "he/she knows best", and move towards empowering other
school governors in such a way that they become "equals". In essence,
this is primarily an ethical issue, meaning that an agreement should
follow the general rules and can only be morally binding (valid) if
such agreement was achieved through the process of deliberation. To
test whether deliberation was actually instituted, such agreement
should conform to the following features:
1. Participation in such deliberation is governed by norms of
equality and symmetry (all have the same chances to initiate
speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate);
2. All have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation;
and
3. All have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very
rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are
applied or carried out (Benhabib, 1996:70).
In conforming to the assigned rules, every representative operates
within the SGB on the same level as every other representative. In
other words, they are equal in terms of their ability to influence
decisions. In this way the "power play" inherent in Habermas's under-
standing of "communication" could arguably be neutralised. Delibe-
rative democracy in this sense can also be correlated to practical
rationality, because it potentially leads to a tolerance of or leniency
towards new information. Put differently, the deliberative process it-
self is likely to lead the individual to further critical reflection on
his/her already held views and opinions. In other words, one individual
cannot possess all the information deemed relevant to a certain
decision, which would affect all. Through deliberation, information is
sifted and perceived from different perspectives, culminating in a deci-
sion which previously might not have been conceived. Conversely,
nobody can convince others of his/her point of view without being
able to state why, what appears good, plausible, just and expedient to
him/her can also be considered so from the standpoint of all involved.
Consequently, one might also argue that no outcome or decision would
forever remain fixed, permanent or rigid; on the contrary it should
always be open to revision or re-examination. One, however, needs to
take cognisance of the warning that deliberation, though a necessary
condition, is not a sufficient condition for practical rationality, because
it can be misinterpreted, misapplied or even abused. 
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We now address the issue of majority rule as the last gap that we
have identified in relation to dialogue. In relation to the appointment
of teachers, our interaction with school governors suggests that most
appointments are finalised by means of a vote, meaning majority rule.
In fact in one school the school manager was appalled by an outcome
which was arrived at in this manner. Interpreting this situation after
hearing his story leads us to understand that majority rule does not
necessarily lead to the desired outcome. In our reading of Benhabib,
we find that in many instances majority rule is a fair and sometimes
rational procedure to formulate a decision, not because legitimacy
resides in numbers, but because if a majority is convinced, and there
is no other means of overcoming an impasse, democracy relies on this
procedure. So in the absence of consensus, a majority decision-making
procedure does not seem inappropriate. It is, however, our contention
that problems seem to occur when the voting is not preceded by rea-
soned discussion and debate, thus undermining the procedure of ra-
tionality, which we hold is a constitutive principle of democracy.
Benhabib (1996:72) reinforces this understanding when she argues
that the "deliberative discourse model makes provisions against its
own misuses and abuses in that the reflexivity condition built into the
model allows abuses and misapplications ... to be challenged. No
outcome is prima facie fixed but can be revised and be subjected to
re-examination." This statement also reinforces the previous warning
that the constitutive principle of practical rationality within the delibe-
rative discourse is open to misinterpretation, misapplication and abuse.
This leads us to conclude that a majority decision is valid, but
space should exist to challenge such a decision. The majority decision
remains valid only until it can be challenged by good reasons and
rational debate. Implementing such a procedure when teacher ap-
pointments are considered might be problematic for the "challenge"
should occur prior to a permanent appointment being effected. This
problem might be minimised if reasoned arguments (rational debates)
are produced in determining why a representative votes for a particular
candidate. This does not seem implausible if one considers that such
a procedure could potentially overcome the burden of staff dissatis-
faction, which the manager at one school alluded to. Habermas (1997:
47) supports this interpretation when he posits that "A majority deci-
sion may come about only in such a way that its content is regarded as
the rationally motivated but fallible result of an attempt to determine
what is right through a discussion that has been brought to a pro-
visional close under the pressure to decide". Rationality in this sense,
therefore, precedes majority rule where the decision arrived at remains
regarded as fallible, meaning that there is space for re-examination or
revision. Because the decision was made under pressure and the ma-
jority rule procedure was implemented simply to overcome an im-
passe, it therefore remains provisional. Again this leads us to under-
stand that the decision is open to future challenge if, and when,
reasoned arguments become available to contest the earlier achieved
outcome. Majority rule within a deliberative discourse should, there-
fore, be interpreted as a temporary procedure only to be implemented
in the face of an impasse. The initial aim should be a movement to-
wards a deliberative form of consensus. The majority decision is
therefore a conditional consensus, meaning the consent of the minority
to a practice that conforms to the will of the majority. This does not
translate into the minority, by resigning their will, therefore declaring
their opinion to be incorrect, nor does it require the minority to aban-
don their aims, but rather that they forego the practical application of
their convictions, until they succeed in better establishing their rea-
sons, thus convincing the majority to move towards their point of
view. The deliberative understanding of majority rule does not coin-
cide with majority rule as currently practised within the domain of the
identified SGBs. Majority rule as currently practiced seems, therefore,
to be less democratic. We contend that to move towards more demo-
cratic practices, the majority rule concept should be applied in the
sense argued for, meaning the incorporation of deliberative discourse
as an inherent aspect of the procedure. Deliberation in this sense
creates a potential way out of the currently accepted implementation
of majority rule, with its winner takes all scenario. In fact, it is our
contention that the deliberative discourse model could be applied to
potentially ensure that SGBs in previously disadvantaged communities
function in such a way that they endorse the principles of democracy
as espoused by the Act.
Finally, the notion of democratic school governance this article
proposes is one grounded in meanings related to deliberation, concern
for the other, recognition of unheard voices, and inclusion at all levels
of participation on the part of governing body members. Our case
study has hopefully raised important concerns about current weak-
nesses in the implementation of policy matters in relation to democra-
tic governance. Unless policy on governance is implemented together
with a serious commitment to nurturing the innate capacities of SGB
members, democratic governance has little chance of being realised in
post-apartheid disadvantaged schools.
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